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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUN
STATE OF GEORGIA
CURTIS LEE MAYFIELD, III et aI.,

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
MARVIN HEIMAN, et aI.,
)
)
Defendants,
)
------------- )

Civil Action File No. 2009CV166043

ORDER ON HARRISON AND KATTEN'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DISMISSAL ORDERS
This case is before the Court on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and a Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Defendants Arnold Harrison ("Harrison"), Katten Muchin
Rosenman LLP, and Katten, Muchin, Zavis ("Katten"). Plaintiffs are named beneficiaries ofa
trust created by the musician Curtis Lee Mayfield, Jr. ("the Trust"). Harrison is an attorney who
performed legal services for the Trust. Harrison was a partner with the law firm Katten, Muchin,
Zavis (now known as Katten, Muchin, Rosenman, LLP since May 2, 2005) from 1981 until June,
2001.
Harrison and Katten previously filed Motions to Dismiss upon which this Court ruled in
Orders dated October 12, 2009. In light ofthose order, the only remaining claim against
Harrison and Katten in this case is one for breach of fiduciary duty asserted by Curtis Lee
Mayfield, III ("Mayfield, III").

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
On November 4,2009, Harrison and Katten filed amended answers attaching, among
other things, a release signed by Mayfield, III in April 2000 ("2000 Release"). Harrison and
Katten argue that judgment in their favor should be entered on the remaining claim against them
in this case based on the 2000 Release.

A previous ruling in this case voided the 2000 Release pursuant to O.C.G.A. §53-12194(a) and this Court was bound by that ruling as the law ofthe case. However, the Court of
Appeals has recently ruled that O.C.G.A. §53-12-194(a) does not void the 2000 Release.
In pertinent part, the 2000 Release provides:
13. Indemnification, Hold Harmless and Release. For and in consideration of the
distribution ofthe Net Principal Amount, the Beneficiary does hereby ...
(d) Release, any and all claims which the Beneficiary now has or may have had, however
arising in law or in equity against the Estate of Curtis Lee Mayfield, any trust created by
or for Curtis Lee Mayfield of which Beneficiary was a primary or residuary beneficiary,
inclusive of any claim against the Mayfield Family Trust (formerly known as the
Mayfield Revocable Trust) as the trustees, agents and attorneys for all of said trusts.

This Court finds that the 2000 Release expressly releases Harrison and Katten as
"attorneys" for a ''trust created by or for Curtis Lee Mayfield ofwhich Beneficiary was a primary
or residuary beneficiary."
In light of the Court of Appeals opinion, this Court finds that the 2000 Release bars
Mayfield, Ill's remaining claim against both Harrison and Katten based on any of their conduct
that occurred prior to the execution of the 2000 Release on April 21, 2000. Mayfield, Ill's claim
against Harrison and Katten based on any oftheir conduct occurring after April 21, 2000 remains
pending in this case.
Motion for Reconsideration

On October 12, 2009 the Court entered orders on Harrison and Katten's motions to
dismiss. In those orders, the Court found that the statute oflimitations did not bar Mayfield,
Ill's breach of fiduciary duty claim against Harrison and Katten. In support of their motion for
reconsideration, Harrison and Katten again argue that an attorney, Jackson Culbreth, was a
general agent of Plaintiffs in 1999-2000 so that any knowledge he had as to Harrison and

Katten's alleged wrongdoing at that time was attributable to Plaintiffs and started the running of
the statute oflimitations period. The Court fmds otherwise. The Court acknowledges that
Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 91 oftheir Complaint that Culbreth was "representing Altheida
Mayfield and the other heirs, in their individual capacities." However, the Court finds that the
phrase "in their individual capacities" is meant to distinguish Culbreth's representation of the
heirs in the probate ofthe estate from any representation they had as Trust beneficiaries. While
there may be evidence to show that Culbreth represented the Trust during certain periods in the
past and that he represented the executors and the heirs ofthe estate of Curtis Lee Mayfield, Jr.,
there is nothing to support a finding that Culbreth was a general agent of Plaintiffs so that his
knowledge may be imputed to them for statute oflimitations purposes.
Harrison and Katten further argue that the remaining breach of fiduciary duty claim
asserted against them by Mayfield, III should be dismissed as "merely duplicative" of a
malpractice claim that he is not asserting in this case under the holding in McMann v. Mockler,
233 Ga. App. 279 (1998). That case makes clear that "[a] professional malpractice action is
merely a professional negligence action." Id. at 280. Here, Mayfield, III is not asserting any
professional negligence claim, rather he is asserting a breach of fiduciary duty based on
intentional and willful (not merely negligent) misconduct. Therefore, there is no duplication of
claims. The Court finds that Mayfield, Ill's breach of fiduciary duty claim may proceed.
Harrison and Katten again argue that the claims against them should be dismissed
because service was never proper in Plaintiffs' 2007 action-the action upon which this renewal
action is based. Under Georgia's Long Arm Statute, service upon an out-of-state defendant must
conform to the law of the state where service is had. Illinois permits service by a sheriff or, for
Cook County, by a special process server appointed by the court. Here, a Fulton Superior Court

judge issued an order appointing a special process server. Harrison and Katten argue that the
appointment must have been by a Cook County judge and that the number ofthe certificate
issued to the process server must be on the order.
[T]he core function of service is to supply notice of the pendency of a legal action, in a
manner and at a time that affords the defendant a fair opportunity to answer the complaint
and present defenses and objections. Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 671-672
(1996) (quoted in Georgia Pines Community Svc. Bd. v. Summerlin, 282 Ga. 339, 343
(2007)).
Again, this Court will not dismiss a case upon such a technical ground where Katten had notice.
A Florida appellate court made much the same decision. Takiffv. Takiff, 683 So.2d 595
(Fla.App. 3 Dist 1996).
Katten also argues that service was improper as to it because the Complaint with which it
was served on three occasions was deficient as it was not identical to the Complaint filed with
the Court, e.g. it was missing a few exhibits. The Court finds it troubling that Katten, a law firm,
did nothing to notifY Plaintiffs of what must have been an inadvertence. Katten could have
called anyone of several co-Defendants (including Jenner & Block, a fellow law firm) to secure
the missing exhibits. Katten is represented by the same attorneys as its co-Defendant and former
partner, Harrison, and it could have gotten any missing exhibits from them. Katten was clearly
on notice ofthe claims filed against it because it received the Complaint on two occasions prior
to the Plaintiffs' dismissal oftheir 2007 action and once after that dismissal. The Court finds
that the service deficiency in the 2007 action has not prejudiced Katten at all in this case. The
Court notes that Katten's Motion to Dismiss has been fully addressed and resulted in the
dismissal of all but one claim against it. This Court seeks to do substantive justice and it refuses
to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims on a technicality that has caused no prejudice in this case.

SO ORDERED this 16th day of December, 2009.
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ELIZABETH E. LONG, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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